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1. Introduction 
In many of the small communities of South Africa's West Coast, the economic driver 
has traditionally been the fishing industry. Employment opportunities were largely 
located either on board the vessels or in a fish-processing factory which in some 
smaller centres was a monopsonistic employer. The last two decades have seen this 
system under threat. Fish stocks have declined and fish populations have move 
southward, while the fishing industry has been restructured to meet BEE imperatives, 
meaning that old established firms found their quotas even further decreased. To cut 
costs, fishing companies shed jobs and in extreme cases shut down their smaller 
operations. As they left the smaller centres they took with them their managerial 
skills, as well as capital and employment. The fishermen and women in these towns, 
have found it difficult to fill the vacuum, lacking as they do, organisation, access to 
credit, administrative and marketing skills, and above all critical information related 
to the process of issuing fishing rights (Isaacs, 2006, 57), (Amason & Kashorte, 2006, 
48). 
The decline of the West Coast fisheries was latterly accompanied by the extension of 
the permit process; access to the resource being restructured initially in a 'medium 
term' and then in a long term rights application process. Those fishermen who were 
unsuccessful in acquiring access rights were trapped in a cycle of poverty and 
increasingly forced to fish illegally or 'poach' to survive. 
The decline of the stock means that there are no simple answers to the problem, I 
argue however, that it would be beneficial for the South African Govemment to 
embark on a co-management programme with these fishing communities. In the first 
half of the paper I outline what co-management is, its benefits and some 
disadvantages, and what is needed for a co-management programme to be successful. 
I then investigate whether co-management would be an appropriate policy for the 
fishing community of Doringbaai, a small centre that has been particularly hard hit by 
the decline ofthe West Coast Rock Lobster stock and the closure of the Oceana Rock 
Lobster processing plant. 
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1.1 Background 
The immediate need in Doringbaai is for jobs: people need to provide for their 
families. The dominant constraint is that the fish stocks are in a state of collapse and 
need time to be rebuilt, while stability in the industry must also be maintained. The 
reality of life in an area with few alternative sources of employment is that personal 
discount rates are high and time horizons accordingly short. In blunt terms, faced by a 
choice between restored stocks in the future and food on the table today, the future is 
bound to loose. 
The Department of Marine and Coastal Management (MCM) describes its objectives 
in terms of' equity, efficiency and ecology'. Theory suggests that one way to achieve 
these three objectives would be for Government to align subsistence fishermen's 
incentive structure with the rest of the industry. If this does not occur, and if 
subsistence fishermen are forced to comply with rules, structures and goals that are 
created for commercial fishermen, they will have little incentive to comply with the 
institutions, especially when these institutions do not address their socio-economic 
needs (Hooper & Lynch, 2006). Unsurprisingly, when subsistence fishermen are 
excluded from the fishing industry, they tend to support the poachers rather than 
MCM, which further jeopardises sustainability and economic stability (van Sittert et 
aI., 2006, 109). 
Recurring themes in both the local literature and in discussions with the community 
members themselves are that subsistence fishermen have little formal education, have 
limited access to capital and have very few employment options. Another common 
thread is the call for greater community participation in the design of policies and 
programmes before their implementation; the belief being that this would both 
improve the policies and increase public compliance with them. Accordingly, I 
conclude the paper by recommending that any steps taken by MCM need to use a 
bottom-up approach, i.e. they should involve the community in the decision making 
process. This means that the communities and stakeholders need to be consulted, and 
community leaders be given a chance to assist with the setting of the agenda or policy. 
-2-
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This paper is necessarily discursive. It is based on a limited local literature and 
discussions with researchers in the field, personnel at Marine and Coastal 
Management, and fishermen in Cape Town. It also draws heavily on a week spent in 
Doringbaai engaging with stakeholders and attending key meetings between members 
of the Doringbaai community and Oceana. I must also acknowledge the assistance of 
the former deputy director general of MCM, Mr Horst Kleinschmidt. Unfortunately, 
there is little official data available on this topic, and that which is available is not 
currently accessible as a result of quota appeals pending. 
2. What is co-management? 
Co-management can be understood as an agreement between government and various 
stakeholders, concerning management of a resource whereby responsibility for the 
management of the resource is shared between them. In the case of South Africa, 
MCM would develop a partnership with the relevant stakeholders (the local residents 
and resource users) and then negotiate their respective functions, rights and 
responsibilities with regard to the area (Carlsson & Berkes, 2005, 66). 
The function of co-management is to facilitate a partnership for state and non-state 
actors, to provide incentives for local resource users to use the resources in a 
sustainable manner and also, it is a tool in which the responsibilities and power is 
shared in a manner that conserves the resource in question (Hara, 2003, 20). 
The first assumption of co-management is that the resource will benefit if the local 
people have a stake in the conservation and management of the resource and the 
second assumption is that a partnership is formed between the state and non-state 
actors, which includes the local resource users (Hara, 2003, 20). To these should be 
added a third: co-management requires a sedentary stock. If the community is to be 
given a property right to the local resource, then that resource should spend its 
commercially valuable lifespan in the area controlled by the community. Fugitive 
stocks such as pelagic fish (pilchard, anchovy, tuna etc) are by their nature unsuited to 
this form of control. 
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There are degrees of co-management arrangements. These range from government 
centralised systems in which community members are merely consulted before 
policies are put in place, to fully devolved systems in which the community self-
governs its access to the resource and the government plays a minor role in 
management (Pomeroy & Berkes, 1997, 466), (Kuperan, Mustapha, Abdullah, 
Pomeroy, Genio, Salamanca, 1998 , I) , (Carlsson & Berkes, 2005, 66). 
There is no standard co-management structure that can be applied to every situation. 
Within the spectrum described above there are five standard types of co-management 
structure, the most appropriate for a given area having to be determined on a case-by-
case basis. They are classified into groups according to the extent of the 
responsibilities devolved, the degree of power sharing and the roles that government 
and fishers play: 
• Instructive: Government holds all the power and responsibilities. Government 
relay s information to the fishermen on the decisions that are being made. 
• Consultative: Government consults with fishers, but ultimately the decisions 
are made by the government. 
• Cooperative: in this arrangement, government and fishers are equal partners 
with respect to the decision-making. 
• Advisory: Fishers advise the government on decisions that need to be taken 
and the government endorses these decisions. 
• Informative: the government has delegated the decision-making authority to 
fisher groups who are responsible for informing government of the decisions 
made (Pomeroy & Ahmed, 2006, 13). 
Importantly in a local context, government has a role in the coordination of scientific 
and stock estimation data. Even where local fishermen argue that they are best able to 
assess local stocks, the State remains best suited to providing a bigger picture of stock 
conditions and expectations. South Africa has a history of fisheries associations 
(including one for Rock Lobster) and there is a private research sector, but the State 
remains the dominant provider of research services. 
- 4 -
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There is no co-management structure that can be directly copied from one area to 
another because each community has its unique characteristics. Rather, a basic 
structure is used and adjusted to the needs and characteristics of the area. Which 
structure is initially used is negotiated between government and the community 
members, but the government always plays the more decisive role. The key to co-
management is the negotiation and agreement between the state and non-state actors 
concerning the sharing of power and allocating responsibilities (Pomeroy & Ahmed, 
2006,14). 
Co-management should be conceptualised as a process rather than an end result. The 
devolution of authority means that co-management is more flexible than centralised 
management. By design, it is able to adapt to the local circumstances of the 
community. As Jentoft, McCay & Wilson(1998) comment, co-management is not a 
fixed thing. It is an evolving process guided by a set of institutional principles (Jentoft 
et aI, 1998,434). In an earlier paper, Jentoft & McCay (1995) noted that fisheries 
management systems evolved gradually and were not the product of some grand 
design (Jentoft & McCay, 1995, 236). The same principles should thus be applied to 
co-management systems, where the initial structure is put in place and as the need 
arises, is changed and adjusted gradually. A co-management structure can evolve 
from being instructive to consultative, and if needed, eventually evolve to an 
infonnative co-management structure. Evolution will occur as fishers build their 
capacity and their knowledge, and as the trust between government and the 
community members is strengthened. 
2.1 Co-management and Property rights 
The literature identifies four analytical property rights regimes for common pool 
resources. The first is Open Access or non-property where there is a complete 
absence of property rights. The second is Common property where the resource is 
used and controlled by an identifiable community or group. The third treatment is 
State property where the government controls and manages the resource and it 
detennines who has access to the resource and how much of the resource can be used. 
The last treatment of property rights is Private property where an individual or a 
- 5 -
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
wn
company holds the rights to the resource (Pomeroy & Ahmed, 2006, 17), (Hara, 2003, 
16) & (Pomeroy & Berkes, 1997,467). 
Co-management is a structure that is positioned between state property and 
communal property. The problem faced by local resource users is how to act 
collectively so that free-riding, corruption and rent seeking are kept to a minimum. 
Fishers need to allocate resources in a manner that is equitable and economically 
efficient among users and they need to develop or change the incentives so that the 
resource is used in a sustainable manner (Pomeroy & Ahmed, 2006, 18). 
Incentives can be changed by giving resource-users more responsibility for regulatory 
functions. If users are given more responsibilities, they are more likely to act 
responsibly and to comply with the regulations that they have helped to develop 
(Jentoft et al, 1998, 426). When the institutional setting changes, the actions of the 
resource uses will also change, especially in small fishing communities where the 
social network is more integrative than in large, urban settings. For the institutional 
setting (0 change, it is implicitly assumed that rules are developed so that fishers are 
informed as to which actions and outcomes are permissible (Pomeroy & Ahmed, 
2006, 19). The rules thus provide stability for the community because they will 
automatically know what should be monitored and enforced and that transgressors 
will be punished. 
2.2 Why might co-management be a better alternative? 
The top-down centralised approach has not prevented the over exploitation of marine 
stocks. Opponents of top down decision-making insist that this management style has 
been proven ineffective in the promotion of long-term stability. They also argue that 
top down management approaches have generally ignored the needs of the resources 
users, rather focusing on economic and more recently, resource objectives. 
Part of the reason for the lack of stability is that resource users and stakeholders have 
been excluded from the decision making process which led to a lack of buy-in by user 
groups, low levels of compliance,..and ineffective controls on exploitation (Hanna, 
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10/05/06), (Hauck & Sweijd, 1999, 1029), & (Nielson, Degnbol, Viswanathan, 
Ahmed, Hara, Abdullah, 2004, 153). 
It is also argued that the top-down approach has led to the lack of legitimacy of the 
system (Jentoft, 2000, 142) & (van Sittert et ai, 2006, 105) If those who have been 
denied access rights feel that the process lacks legitimacy, as is the case with South 
Africa's artisanal' fishing communities, fishers will continue to contravene the 
regulations. Importantly, even those who accept the system's legitimacy will be 
likely to contravene its regulations - the system will lose its credibility throughout the 
fishing fraternity since an attitude of "if they can do it, why can't we", will be 
adopted (Hersoug & Holm, 2000, 231). In the case of an already depleted resource 
this could totally destabilise the industry. 
2.3 Benefits of Co-management: 
Co-management is considered a more democratic governance system because there is 
more involvement from the resource's stakeholders. It also implies that these parties' 
opinions matter and are considered in the decision-making process. Not only are non-
state actors included in the decision making process, but they also incur some 
responsibilities that are usually held by the state only. The involvement of non-state 
actors in the management of the resource will lead to greater community buy-in, 
acceptance and voluntary compliance compared to the top-down, centralised 
approach (Nielson et ai, 2004, 153) , (Jentoft, 2000, 57) & (Alpizar, 2005, 2). 
A further advantage is the view (commonly stated at public meetings attended by 
fishermen) that local resource users have in depth knowledge of the area in which 
they extract the resource. Sharing this with the State should add to the overall level of 
knowledge available to both the scientific modellers and the resource users. The rules 
and management of the resource will be better suited and more effective than the top-
down approach since it includes local knowledge and information inputs. There is 
I Note that the term artisinal is not recognized in South African maritime policy. Artisinal fishers are 
classified as either subsistence fishermen or Limited Commercial Sector. 
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thus a sharing of responsibility, power and knowledge among parties (Pomeroy & 
Berkes, 1997,467) & (Jentoft et ai, 1998,434). 
The initial stages of co-management structures are time consuming and expensive due 
to the intensive consultation between state and non-state actors and local institutions 
need to be built up. If the co-management arrangement is appropriately designed, 
including the local community and resource users there are likely to be savings that 
offer a practical benefit to the State (Hannah, 10105/06), (Alpizar, 2005, 2). In the 
local context, it could cut costs of Government's policing and monitoring functions at 
a time when MCM is under increasing pressure to perform while facing severe 
resource constraints. (Hara, 2003, 31) 
Because co-management involves the local users in the process of setting the rules of 
the management of the resource, sharing the power and responsibility of monitoring 
the resource, the legitimacy of government is strengthened and compliance and 
commitment to the programme among resource users are also enhanced (Jentoft et ai, 
1998,423) & (Alpizar, 2005, 2). 
Pomeroy and Ahmed (2006) list additional advantages of a co-management 
programme: a more transparent, accountable and autonomous management system; a 
system more economical than centralised management, requiring less to be spent on 
management and administration in the long-run; improved stewardship of aquatic and 
coastal resources and management; management is accountable to local areas so 
fishing communities can devise solutions that are more appropriate to local 
conditions; fishers view the resource as a long-term asset rather than discount its 
future returns and so use the resource in a more sustainable manner; stakeholders are 
brought together so there's a holistic understanding of the resource; standards are 
enforced more effectively by communities than by bureaucracies can; social conflict 
is minimised because the community has a common goal to work towards (Pomeroy 
& Ahmed, 2006, 22-23). 
- 8 -
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2.4 Disadvantages of co-management 
The workability of Co-management clearly depends on the nature of the local 
community. Strong, cohesive and stable communities are key to successful co-
management. Unfortunately, ideal communities, i.e. social groups that possesses 
shared beliefs, stable membership, the expectation of continuing interaction and a 
pattern of relations that are direct and multiplex, rarely exist (Jentoft, 2000, 58). 
Communities aren't guaranteed to be homogenous; there are different interest groups 
and so a community does not function as a cohesive unit. There are differences, 
divisions, conflicts and inequities within communities. Power is not distributed 
equally in a community, and there may not be strong linkages between community 
members (Kapoor, 2001, 275) & (Pomeroy & Ahmed, 2006,16). 
It has been argued that in some South African fishing centres geographic co-existence 
does not automatically imply a sense of community. Van Sittert (2003, 210) in 
particular argues identifying fishing communities in South Africa is not always a 
practical task. He contends that the fishing communities that do exist, especially 
along the West Coast, were artificially engineered around fish processing plants in the 
early 1900s at a time when free housing, food and alcohol were exchanged for labour. 
Against this view it should be remembered that much time has passed since the 
establishment of these plants, and that while towns such as St Helena Bay may be 
fractured, in small centres like Doringbaai linkages have been fostered by shared 
adversity. Practices such as food sharing2 are still conspicuous and social networks, 
being smaller, are also stronger. 
The main argument against co-management is that free-riding exists and fishermen 
cannot be trusted to control their fishing effort (Jentoft et ai, 1998, 424) & (Acheson, 
Stockwell & Wilson, 2000, 53). There is a concern that co-management programmes 
are being established at a faster pace than research on factors that influence their 
failure or success (Alpizar, 2005, 2). 
2 A portion of a catch is typically sold and portion kept for home consumption. Fishermen with a good 
catch may share out a a portion of their 'keep' with families that had a poorer take or who face some 
other problem. 
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Pomeroy & Ahmed (2006) provide a comprehensive list of disadvantages to co-
management regimes: co-management is not the solution for every fishing 
community. 
Communities may not be willing or able to take on the responsibility of co-
management; 
appropriate institutions may not exist within the community to initiate or 
sustain co-management efforts; 
there are high transaction costs in the short-run. Costs include time, financial 
costs, and human resources to establish co-management. 
The incentives to engage in co-management may not exist for individuals or 
for the community itself; 
the risks involved in changing fisheries management strategies may be too 
high for some communities and fishers; 
the costs may outweigh the expected benefits to participate in co-management 
strategies; 
there may be insufficient political will to support co-management 
progranunes; 
government officials may not want to share power; 
the community may not have the capacity to be an effective and equitable 
governing institution; 
actions by user groups outside the immediate community may undermine or 
destroy the management activities undertaken by the community; 
particular local resource characteristics may make it difficult for the 
community to manage the resource; 
the need to develop a consensus from a wide range of interests may lengthen 
the decision-making process and result in a weaker, compromised measures, 
there may be a shift in "power bases" that are not in the best interest of all 
partners; 
individuals may feel that there are more appropriate alternatives available; the 
power-sharing may be distorted and used in a corrupt manner (Pomeroy & 
Ahmed, 2006, 23-24). 
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Implementing a co-management regime does not guarantee that it will prove to be a 
success. The management structure needs to be designed so that it succeeds (Nielson 
et ai, 2004,158), (Alpizar, 2005, 4) & (Jentoft, 2000, 59). 
To improve co-management's chances of succeeding, the government needs to playa 
supporting role (Acheson et ai, 2000, 60). It can do this by assigning and clearly 
specifying property rights to a community. Without property rights, the community 
will have no assurance oflegitimate participation (Harmah, 10/05/06). Property rights 
must be developed so that communities are assured that government or private parties 
will not appropriate the communal resources. The community may stop believing that 
co-management can work because of the uncertainty surrounding the property rights 
(Kapoor, 2001, 276). If community members are unsure as to where they stand, they 
will not believe that they own the co-management process and thus community buy-
in and voluntary compliance will be jeopardised. 
The co-management structure should also have a legal basis, as found in Norway and 
Japan, the only two documented cases of a successful partnership. Government also 
needs to devolve some of its power (Pomeroy & Berkes, 1997,468). The government 
must allow the community to participate in the setting of the agenda and have a role 
in the decision-making (Jentoft, 2000, 57). 
2.5 Lessons learnt from South African Examples 
Hauck & Sowrnan (2001) analyse nine different co-management initiatives in South 
Africa and draw ten lessons from the experiences. Co-management is in the infant 
stages in South Africa. The programmes are in diverse sectors, do not pertain to the 
fishery sector exclusively and vary in terms of how long they have been in operation. 
The shortest co-management initiative was three months (Pondoland Forestry) and 
the longest was between twenty and twenty-five years (Hake industry-government 
initiative) (Hauck & Sowman, 2001,177). 
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The ten lessons learnt: 
I. Resource users need to secure access rights. 
Where co-management was used to replace poaching, the first priority was to 
secure access rights so that users have a sense of ownership by having 'priority 
access' to the resource (Hauck & Sowman, 2001, 178). 
2. There is a lack of commitment on the part of govemment. 
Government needs to devolve more power and playa more supportive role to 
fishing communities. The roles and responsibilities of the state and non-state 
actors must be negotiated. Government should be wary of dictating who does 
what as it can be misconstrued that the status quo of centralised management 
will remain. Since co-management is a process, the roles and responsibilities of 
the stakeholders can evolve (Hauck & Sowman, 2001,183). 
3. Communities and government officials lack the capacity to implement co-
management initiatives. 
There is room for government officials to learn how to change their 
management style from an autocratic to a more democratic and supportive role. 
Capacity building on the part of communities will empower the community and 
it will enhance the participatory process of co-management, as it would be more 
involved and meaningful (Hauck & Sowman, 2001, 180). 
4. Problem of local representation: Change and Accountability 
In some cases, there was local representation but the representatives failed to 
involve the community in the decision-making process. They also failed to relay 
important information to community stakeholders. Community stakeholders 
have insufficient capacity to fulfil certain responsibilities and also become 
weary of attending so many meetings (Hauck & Sowman, 2001,180). 
5. Objectives differ across and between stakeholders 
Stakeholders had different objectives both across co-management projects and 
within a project. In some cases not all of the non-state actors supported the 
project. State and non-state stakeholders had different objectives (e.g. St. Lucia 
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gillnetting project). It is therefore imperative that objectives are aligned from 
the onset of the project (Hauck & Sowman, 2001, 180). 
6. Need to consider alternative economic opportunities 
Resource users must look at alternatives to harvest use of the resource, such as 
tourism, especially where the resource is overexploited. To guide their decision, 
stakeholders need to consider what strengths and weaknesses their towns have 
in terms of marketable assets. 
7. Enforcement and compliance is important 
With the allocation of access rights through co-management programmes, 
resource users were harvesting resources that were historically denied to them. 
Rules pertaining to the harvesting of resources therefore need to be negotiated 
between the state and non-state actors. Trust and voluntary compliance between 
stakeholders will be built if the rules are negotiated, rather than scientists and 
fishery compliance officers telling resource users what they can and cannot do. 
Ultimately, when deciding what the rules are the power will rest in the hands of 
government (Hauck & Sowman, 2001,180). 
8. Funding is unreliable and resources In the preliminary stages are 
underestimated 
Co-management projects have been shut down because there was a lack of 
funding (e.g. Kleinrnond Inshore Fishery was terminated after nine months). 
The amount of time, financial and human resources (before decisions are 
negotiated) are underestimated and therefore not accurately taken into 
consideration (Hauck & Sowman, 2001,182). 
9. Communities need a long-term champion 
One or two key individuals, who have been there from the start of the project, 
are needed to provide support, motivation, encouragement and information to 
the community (Hauck & Sowman, 2001,182). 
10. To maintain co-management projects, the projects need to be monitored and 
evaluated 
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Where resource harvesting takes place, it is essential that catches are monitored 
and recorded so that sustainable use and management can be developed. Local 
knowledge plays a role in the monitoring of the resource, as locals may be able 
to explain previous resource usage and data. The co-management project should 
also be monitored so that it can be tweaked as it is developed (Hauck & 
Sowman, 2001, 180). 
3. Doringbaai: the case study 
On Wednesday, 7'h February 2007, Oceana staff came to Doringbaai to strip the 
equipment from the factory they had under lease from the State. The community 
protested by blockading the trucks, burning tyres and venting their anger at the staff 
of Oceana. The police eventually calmed the protestors and a meeting was held the 
following week between community members, Oceana and Marine and Coastal 
Management (MCM). 
In the 2005 round of applications for long-term Cluster C access rights, the fishermen 
and some community members applied for quotas. None of the fishermen were 
successful in their application for long-term rights! The reason given by MCM was 
that they were not historically involved in the fishing industry. By historical 
involvement, MCM does not mean that the applicants did not fish, but that they had 
been unsuccessful in earlier (2002) medium-term allocation process and thus had not 
invested in the fishing industry. There are however four quota holders that share a 
limited commercial quota with other members elsewhere and have a processing 
agreement with Lusitania, another company in Cape Town. 
Officials from MCM went to Doringbaai to investigate the discrepancy and 
interviewed the applicants. The interviews were conducted to find those who would 
have qualified prior to 2001. MCM needed to intervene so as not to have a system 
that 'blindly' allocated rights without referring to the locality and histories of the 
applicants.3 The initial allocation of access rights without looking at the context and 
3 Kleinschmidt pers. com. March 2006 
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the social background of the applicants was the initial point of failure. As a result, 
applicants who should not have received access rights, received them in the medium-
term, while the "real" fishermen were excluded from the medium-term process, and 
ultimately therefore from the long-term process because they did not fit the statistical 
criteria of the rights allocation package. 
Eventually 11 (25%) out of the 44 original applicants were successful. These 
fishermen received a quota allocation of 750 kg's. The officials discovered on their 
visit that fishermen were poor and because they had no other employment 
opportunities in the town, fishermen bought recreational permits and then illegally 
sold the WCRL that they caught. 
In a study that looked at the growth potential of towns in the Western Cape, 
van der Merwe (2004), identified towns that were growth nodes. Doringbaai was not 
identified as one of these towns; indeed the nearest growth node to Doringbaai was 
Vredendal, 65 kilometres to the South. He also comments that without an increase in 
job opportunities which constitute a town's economic base, there can be no growth 
(van der Merwe, 2004, 13). This is especially true of Doringbaai whose internal 
economy rests unstably on a single industry. 
3.1 Background information to Doringbaai 
According to the 1996 Census Data,4 5 per cent of the population in Doringbaai are 
African, 90,3 per cent are of coloured descent and 4,2 per cent of the population 
belongs to the white race group. 
The immediately post-apartheid village of Doringbaai described in the 1993 HSRC 
report5 is in some respects little different to the present fishing town. There have been 
4 The data used is from the HSRC Report (1993), Census 1996 and the West Coast Poverty Alleviation 
Strategy that uses Census 200 I data. The data is used to provide a general overview of Doringbaai and 
is not used for comparison purposes. I am able to do this because the medium-term rights allocation 
only occurred in 2002. The major difference between 1996 and 2000 was that the Unemployment rates 
increased from 20,4% to 53,4% respectively; it was thereafter that the medium term rights allocation 
process provided the major shock to the local economy. 
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some improvements and some deterioration in the quality of the lives of its 
inhabitants. In 1993 there was no doctor available in the town except when the mobile 
clinic made its rounds on a Wednesday morning. There was no public transport, such 
as taxis, available and it was expensive to travel to the surrounding towns. There was 
also no preschool though some unemployed ladies acted as kindergarten teachers and 
tutored the children in preparation for primary school. The houses were provided by 
Oceana. Some houses lacked internal plumbing; the homes were not electrified. A 
lack of recreational facilities for the youth was described as contributing to crime. 
Doringbaai's roads were gravel and were muddy when it rained. The problems that 
the inhabitants faced were similar to those at present, in particular the season for 
WCRL was only four months long and there were few other fish to be caught out of 
season (HSRC report, 1993, 99). The factory supplemented their household income 
by processing and cleaning vegetables in the • off-season' . 
There are very few employment options available to the folk of Doringbaai, with 
54,3 per cent of the population being unemployed; this is much higher than the 
national average. The main reason for the high unemployment rate is that the factory 
that supported the town is no longer in existence. The 54,3 per cent is actually an 
underestimate: being from the census 2001 data it does not take into account the 
closure of the factory in mid-2006. 
Liebrandt, Poswell, Naidoo, Welch & Woolard (2004) uses the upper poverty line of 
R250 per month. Using the Census 2001 data, I calculate that 61,8 per cent of the 
inhabitants in Doringbaai fall within the poverty band. The Census 2001 uses income 
bands, and the lowest two income bands are no income and RI - R400 per month. 
My calculation is therefore biased upward; however, it does provide a startling figure 
and highlights the severity of poverty in Doringbaai. 
Most ofthe coloured people in Doringbaai have little formal education: 10 per cent of 
the coloured population had no schooling, 26 per cent had grade six and 3 per cent 
5 Referenced as Schutte, De W, 1993.'n Ontleding van die ontwikke1ingspotensiaal van geselekleerde vissersgemeenskappe san die Wes- en Suidkus I 
Kaapstad: Raad vir Geesteswetenskaplike Navorsing, 
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had grade twelve. 14,3 per cent of the African population had no schooling, 19,3 had 
grade six while 4,8 per cent had grade twelve. Looking at the white race group, 40 per 
cent had grade twelve education level (Census 1996). Even though the education 
levels of the inhabitants are relatively low, the immediate need is not education, but 
rather, employment generation in the town since there are people in Doringbaai who 
have grade twelve, but are currently unemployed. 
The typical household in the Matzikama Municipal areas (of which Doringbaai is a 
ward) has a monthly income ranging from R601 to RlsOO, households spend an 
average of R1818.ls, with no income being saved. The average household was 
estimated to be incurring a monthly debt of R832 (West Coast Poverty Alleviation 
Strategy, 2006). 
One of the strategies used by those that do not receive an income is to apply for 
grants. These grants are the only source of income that households receive. 73 
inhabitants receive an Old Age pension, 50 people received a Disability grant, 8 
people received a Foster Care grant, 1 person received care dependency grant, and 
124 inhabitants receive a Child Support grant (West Coast Poverty Alleviation 
Strategy, 2006). This does not indicate how many people are supported by the grants. 
Interviews in the town suggested that the grants generally support a household of five 
people. 
The mobile clinic that serves Doringbaai is only open on a Monday and a Wednesday 
from 9:00 until 12:00. The doctor is available on a Wednesday. For urgent medical 
attention at other times families need to pay R200 to get to the nearest doctor. There 
are two registered nurses and one assistant nurse in Doringbaai. Since there is no 
permanent clinic in Doringbaai they commute to work in Vredendal. 
3.1.1 Access to Telephones 
In Doringbaai, 13,6 per cent of the population has access to a telephone in their 
dwellings and have access to a cell phone, 30,3 per cent of the population has access 
to a landline only, 9,6 per cent only own a cell phone, while 27,5 per cent have access 
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to a telephone at a neighbour and 18,9 per cent can access telecommunications via a 
nearby public phone (West Coast Poverty Alleviation Strategy, 2006). 
3.1.2 Access to electricity, water and sanitation and refuse disposal 
81,6 per cent of the Doringbaai population have access to piped water inside their 
dwellings, while 17,8 per cent have piped water inside their yards. 100 per cent of the 
population in Doringbaai has access to electricity. 95 per cent of households in 
Doringbaai have access to a flush toilet (connected to sewerage system), I, I per cent 
have access to a flush toilet (with a septic tank) and I, I per cent have access to a pit 
latrine with ventilation (West Coast Poverty Alleviation Strategy, 2006). All the 
households in Doringbaai have access to refuse disposal service (Census, 1996). 
There are large containers that stand on an unused area in Doringbaai which hold the 
refuse. The municipality collects this refuse when the containers are full. If one 
compares this to 1993, one can see that in terms of basic service delivery, the 
inhabitants are living in a more dignified manner but in terms of employment 
opportunities, the inhabitants are worse off. 
The local economy and infrastructure that drives Doringbaai consists of a boat repair 
company, one grocery stores, one general dealer, three mobile shops, three liquor 
stores, one pub/sports bar (while I was there it was still unlicensed), one restaurant 
(fully licensed), two accommodation places (1 Bed and Breakfast, the other self 
catering accommodation), one petrol pump, one Post agency, one mobile clinic, one 
library, one Police Station, one fishing control office, one Primary School, One Pre-
School, a Multi-Purpose Resource Center, one fully functional Fish Processing 
factory (It hasn't been used to its full capacity because the Oceana's quota has been 
reduced), a sports field and a community hall. There is no harbour in Doringbaai, but 
there is a dilapidated slipway that was supposed to be fixed. 
The closest SMME (Small and Medium Enterprise) development center is in 
Vredenburg which is too far to travel to as very few people in Doringbaai own 
transport and there are high costs associated with travelling to outside towns (as an 
example, if people want to travel to Vredendal, it would cost R200 per trip.) The 
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Multi-Purpose Resource Center is used as: a soup kitchen; people can have their CV 
compiled for a fee of RIO; there is supposed to be internet access there but the 
computers are not functioning. There have also been numerous other projects that 
have been launched by the MPRC. Unfortunately, none of them have been sustainable 
because of a lack of capital, or there is no market for the products that they have made 
(e.g. needlework project). 
There are no banks or ATM's because there is too little money circulating in 
Doringbaai. The service was stopped by ABSA. If one needed money and were 
without private transport, a fare of R200 is paid to get to the nearest bank. On 
average, people travel to Vredendal twice a month to do their shopping. 
4. Methodology 
To asses the potential for co-management6 of the Rock Lobster stock off Doringbaai 
we first have to establish what the nature and extent of the market for the WCRL , 
secondly to find out how the current system operates and lastly to establish the 
community's perceptions about compliance. 
For co-management to work, the fishermen need to comply with the rules agreed 
upon and they need to understand what would happen if they do not fish in a 
sustainable manner. 
One of the conditions for co-management to work is that the area needs to be a closed 
system i.e. the people in the community needs to feel secure that no other person will 
be able to use their resource. 
If the resource is used unsustainably, the result would be catastrophic. One way in 
which they would use the resource unsustainably would be if they had outside 
employment options or if they could pack up and move to another town where they 
could repeat the cycle. 
'Co-management is the policy option that will be assessed in Doringbaai. 
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When a co-management system is in place, the members in the community cannot 
aspire to anything more in the short run than the current system offers. Increased 
effort would upset the balance of the co-management system and increase the 
likelihood that other fishermen would default. 7 This is a critical feature. Unlike 
manufacturing or service industries where increased effort translates into increased 
benefits and where demand is the dominant constraint, in a fishery the resource is the 
constraint. One person can benefit by increasing effort, but if all replicate this 
increase, all will lose. 
Although stock constraints are central, market conditions determine prices and 
therefore incomes of fishermen. Consequently the market needs to be unravelled. 
Who are the buyers and sellers, what drives the going price and what factors cause it 
to change? In addition to these questions one needs to know if fishermen benefit 
through better prices when selling to individuals, i.e. to households, to tourists or to 
restaurant managers from outside Doringbaai. 
4.1 Interviews 
Whilst in Doringbaai, I interviewed seven community members, seven community 
leaders, four successful quota applicants and seven unsuccessful applicants. I also 
interviewed law enforcement officers of Doringbaai. 8 
The interviews were semi-structured, following a preset series of questions, but 
allowing deviation for discussion. The interviews often lasted two to three hours per 
respondent and were conducted in Afrikaans. Other interviews took the form of 
'chats', speaking to people informally, when they saw me walking in the street and 
were curious to find out why I was in Doringbaai (especially since it was not during 
the holiday season). These informal chats provided additional insights into the 
7 Interview with Lance van Sitterl, July 2006 
• A community member is any person that resides in Doringbaai, a community leader is someone that 
holds a position of authority or leadership such as a principal, a political leader, the manager ofthe 
factory. A successful quota holder is an applicant that has been applied for a long-term quota (limited 
commercial or Cluster C quota) while a unsuccessful quota applicant is a person that was unsuccessful 
in their application for a long-term quota (limited commercial or Cluster C quota). 
- 20-
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
community. The questionnaire9 is loosely based on previous work, by the Subsistence 
Fisheries Task Group (SFTG) (1999) and by Anchor Consultants (1999)10. I also 
received input from various researchers in the field. 
In a community with powerful under-currents of local politics it is important not to 
align oneself with a particular group as this would risk alienation from the broader 
community. This strategy is also a pre-requisite for interview objectivity; 
consequently interviews were held unaccompanied by any local community leader. 
5. Key findings and challenges 
5.1 The market system 
5.1.1 The product and price 
The fishermen in Doringbaai primarily catch West Coast Rock Lobster (WCRL -
Jasus lalandii) and Hottentot (Pachymetopon blochii), a line fish. Hottentot are sold 
in bunches of three while WCRL are sold individually. A crew pools its catch 
together and then splits the money equally. The percentage that is taken home varies 
from fisherman to fisherman and from day to day. 
Factors that influence the price of Hottentot and WCRL are: the supply of fish, the 
physical size of the fish and whether the fishermen have transport to travel to other 
towns. The price for Hottentot ranges from R35 to R50 and the price ofWCRL which 
is sold off a recreational permit vary from R15 to R50 per crayfish. Fishermen fetch 
higher prices when there is a limited supply of fish, the size of the fish is large and 
9 The questionnaire used is attached as Appendix E. 
10 Referenced as 
Russell, E., 1999. A socio-economic and resource-management profile of subsistence fishers in South 
Africa: draft report / Pretoria: Dept. of Environmental Affairs and Tourism. Subsistence Fisheries 
Task Group. and Clark, B. M., 1999. Subsistence fisheries programme. [South Africa]: Anchor 
Environmental Consultants respectively. 
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when they have transport to travel to nearby towns. The individual quota holders have 
a marketing agreement with various firms and do not sell their catch along the road 
side or to the community while those with limited commercial quotas catch the 
WCRL in Area 7 (from Saldanha Bay to Hout Bay) and Area 8 (from Hout Bay to 
East of Cape Hangklip). 
Over time the range of factors driving the price of Rock Lobster are more varied. An 
industry representative" suggested that in the years between 2000 and 2006 the major 
drivers had included the exchange rate (most lobster is exported so the rise in the 
Rand from RI2 to the US$ to R6 to the US$ effectively halved the amount processors 
were receiving), the cost of air transport and its availability (the events of 1119/2001 
affected this sharply), demand in the Far East (which is largely seasonal, also took a 
sharp knock when the SARS outbreak affected social dining-out in China) and the 
timing of seasons and extent of catches in Australia, New Zealand, Chile and 
Argentina, where competing products are harvested.'2 Semi-commercial small scale 
fishermen are generally unaware of these issues and often regarded the marked 
fluctuations in dockside prices with hostility and suspicion. 
5.1.2 The Buyers and Sellers 
The fishermen sell their catch among the community members, along the road during 
the holiday season, and to the tourists visiting Doringbaai. Most of the people that 
buy from the fishermen are either housewives or tourists. Since the new regulations 
have come into being, the fishermen are unable to sell their catch openly and the 
tourists cannot find the fishermen as easily as they have in the past. The furthest a 
field that the fishermen sell their catch is in Lutzville and Vredendal. Other places 
that the fishermen sell their catch are Strandfontein, Paapendorp, Luderits and 
Ebenezer which are quite close to Doringbaai. 
Interestingly from a co-management perspective, a number of interviewees suggested 
that when fishermen that poached in the past receive quota, they stop poaching and 
11 Peter Foley, West Coast Rock Lobster Association, 2006. 
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respect the law because they could lose their (more valuable) permit if caught. 
Legitimacy effectively raises the opportunity cost of illegal activities. 
Part of the market system is looking at all the entry and exit points of a place and also 
how accessible it is to the rest of the world. Doringbaai is isolated from urban areas, 
with the closest urban center being Vredendal which is approximately 50 km away 
from Doringbaai. There are only two access points into Doringbaai from Cape Town. 
The one that is used by locals is a shorter, but a riskier route because it is a private 
road owned by Spoomet and it is a gravel road. There have been some fatal motor 
vehicle accidents along the road because it is made of gravel, and is treacherous to 
drive at night and when it has rained. The longer, more picturesque route is through 
the N7 where you drive through all the surrounding towns. There are no airports or 
airfields near Doringbaai so exporting the crayfish via air is not an option. The closest 
train station13 is Lutzville where there is a direct line to Saldanha Bay. 
5.2. The Current System 
It is commonly believed that fishermen use the recreational permit to catch WCRL 
and Hottentot and then sell the catch illegally. This was not the case, as most of the 
people in Doringbaai cannot afford to pay R65 per permit. A trip to the post agency to 
get their records on users of permits showed that 90% of permit holders were holiday 
makers. The reality is that many holiday makers strike agreements with fishermen. 
The holiday makers "give" their recreational permits to the fishermen and in 
exchange the fishermen give the holidaymaker 50% of their catch, using the 
remainder to generate income to and pay for any additional costs incurred (such as 
petrol used to power the boats etc.). 
The recreational permit is valid for one year from the purchase date, only one 
individual can use it at a time, i.e. each crew member needs their own permit, and 
there is a daily catch limit on each recreational permit issued. With a WCRL 
recreational permit, one is allowed to catch 4 lobsters per day and the body of the 
lobster has to be 75mm in length. Fishermen may not catch females and they may not 
13 The railway station is used for commercial purposes only. 
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catch males with a soft shell. The season for WCRL is from September to April. The 
bait recreational permit is a complement to the Hottentot linefish recreational permit 
and is required to collect mussels from the coastline. This allows one to catch 10 
Hottentot fish and ten mussels though fishermen argue that ten mussels are 
insufficient to catch ten Hottentot. 
5.2.1 Fishing Gear Used to catch WCRL and Hottentot 
The fishermen in Doringbaai use hoop nets to catch WCRL and hand lines to catch 
Hottentot. There are a total of ten dinghies in Doringbaai that the fishermen share 
amongst themselves. On a good fishing day, only thirty to forty fishermen can go out 
to sea since there are only ten dinghies in Doringbaai which can take up to four 
people. Because the fishermen use dinghies, they are only allowed out one nautical 
sea mile. If they are caught further than this point or if they do not have life jackets 
aboard, they are fined by the fisheries compliance officer. 
There are no cold storage facilities that the fishermen can use beside their own 
freezers. In the past, the fishermen were allowed to keep their catch in Oceana's cold 
storage unit at no cost to themselves, but this facility is no longer available. 
5.2.2 Getting around limitations 
Fishermen get around catch limitations by high grading their catch. High grading is 
practiced throughout the fishing industry and is therefore not a problem specific to 
Doringbaai. Since there is a daily limit for each permit, when fishermen find that the 
size of their catch is small, they keep it just in case they don't catch any other lobsters. 
Even when they have caught their catch limit for the day, the fishermen continue to 
fish in the hope that they will catch larger fish. Should they do so, they throw the 
smaller size catch back into the ocean because if they are caught with more than their 
limit, it means that the fisheries compliance officer will fine them and confiscate their 
catch. The smaller lobster or fish returned to the ocean are often dead already. Fish 
mortality is therefore greater than fish landings. It is common to hear fishermen say 
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that it is the law that is forcing them to become criminals. Their reasoning is that if the 
policy were more aligned with their needs and constraints, there wouldn't be a need 
for them to evade the rules and regulations. This practice could be circumvented if 
MCM gave the fishers in Doringbaai a concession, and instead of having a daily bag 
limit, gave a weight limit for the season. In this way, a fisherman bringing a small fish 
or lobster aboard has an incentive to return it immediately. 
5.2.3 Fines 
When the fishermen are caught with more fish than the limit allows, they are fined 
and their catch is confiscated. The fines that the fishermen incur when they are caught 
fishing are quite high relative to the income that they receive. Fishermen receive a 
spot fine of R200 per WCRL and RIO per Hottentot if they are caught breaking the 
rules. The fish are also confiscated. 
Fishermen sell their fish to support their families. Fishermen cannot live off fish 
alone. They need to be able to pay for basic necessities such as electricity, food and 
shelter by selling fish. As explained earlier, there aren't many employment 
opportunities in Doringbaai and thus fishermen and the town in general rely on the 
ocean to support them. 
Fishermen who cannot pay their fines are jailed. The jail sentence depends on the 
severity of the fine. When the fishermen are sent to jail, the family lose the head of the 
household and breadwinner and so cannot make ends meet. Fishermen cannot afford 
to pay the fine because they are unemployed so they return to the ocean to catch more 
fish or WCRL. They sell their catch not to only in a bid to support their family, but 
also to pay the fines. 
5.3 Perceptions of the community 
To maintain the anonymity of the respondents, I group them into stakeholder status of 
community members, community leaders (includes law enforcement officers), 
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successful quota applicants, and unsuccessful applicants. For this section, I group the 
perceptions of the community according to the stakeholder group that they belong to. 
5.3.1 Compliance 
Barring the law enforcement officers interviewed, the perception amongst community 
leaders, community members and fishermen was that it was acceptable to poach. In 
the eyes of the people in Doringbaai, the systeml4 has lost its legitimacy. 
Jentoft (2000) argues that legality is not a sufficient condition for a legitimate 
fisheries management regime. Even though the management system may pass the 
legal test, if it cannot be defended on grounds of social justice then it will in all 
likelihood be challenged (Jentoft, 2000, 142). An example is the South African 
fisheries management, which is managed centrally, whereby the traditional fishers 
feel that they have been unfairly excluded from the access rights as they had to 
compete directly with new black entrants, who have had no historical involvement in 
the fishing industry (van Sittert et ai, 2006, 105). When a particular group feels 
excluded from a process then the legitimacy of that process is questioned and non-
compliance on the part of the resource users is, more often than not, a consequence. 
Even though fishermen are caught and fined for selling their catch, this does not deter 
them. Although the fisheries compliance officers are sympathetic towards the broader 
community and the challenges it faces, and understand that fishermen rely on the 
ocean to provide for their families, they also realise that they have a mandate to 
protect the marine resources from being overexploited. The fisheries compliance 
officers also say that the fishermen will not be able to control their effort and thus 
active law enforcement should take place. 
The community members and the fishermen, both quota holders and non-quota 
holders alike, feel that the fisheries compliance officers are too strict and should relax 
some of the rules. They also concur that even though the fishermen are aware of the 
rules, they have no other choice but to sell their catch illegally. Both groups of 
14 The system that is being referred to is the manner in which the fishing rights were allocated to the 
fishermen in the medium and long term allocation rights allocation process. 
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stakeholders say that the law makes them into criminals because they do not have any 
option but to sell their catch since there are no other employment opportunities 
available and that fishing is the only marketable skill that they have. Additionally, 
they say that law enforcement officers in other areas are not as strict as in Doringbaai 
and the rules are not enforced uniformly. 
Community leaders are also sympathetic towards the fishermen because they know 
what conditions the people live in. There is not enough food and parents are unable to 
provide for their children. They say that the ruling that people are not allowed to sell 
their catch if they have a recreational permit is fair to community leaders because they 
are able to provide for their families, but for unemployed fishermen, the rules are 
unfair. One community leader noted that the fishermen didn't poach on a large scale 
because they were too scared of the consequences. 
The groups agree that if there were more employment opportunities and if fishermen 
had access to a more stable income, there would be no need to poach. At the moment 
however, the only way that their families will survive is if they sell their catch. 
5.3.2 The Process of the allocation of access rights (medium and long-term access 
rights) 
There was a unanimous agreement among respondents that the allocation of access 
rights did not occur in a fair and equitable manner. 
A commonly expressed view is that, "The "right" people often didn't get a quota, but 
rather "policemen, teachers and principals, people who have never fished a day in 
their life", received a quota, while fishermen did not receive a quota". It doesn't 
matter that the long-term process occurred in a just and fair manner, when the process 
leading up to it didn't occur in such a manner. 
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5.3.3 Conflict within the community 
The respondents identified two reasons why the community was not as cohesive as it 
could be. The first reason was the quota allocation itself: some of the members in the 
community received quota allocation while others did not. This has increased income 
inequality in Doringbaai - in the past, where everyone had worked at the factory, 
everyone was earning money and most households had roughly similar incomes. The 
increase in unemployment and the cut in permits has created real disparities between 
the few families that still have steady income and the many that have none. There 
were also tales of people who were friends and were no longer on speaking terms. 
The situation has since calmed down, and people are more amicable toward each 
other. 
The reason why there was friction between quota holders and non-quota holders was 
because there was no differentiating factor between the two groups. Community 
members could not understand why some people received a quota allocation while 
other community members did not, especially since they came out of similar 
circumstances. Those that didn't receive quota also felt that the quota holders should 
have ploughed some of their money back into the community and shared their wealth 
with those that were struggling. 
The second reason is that there is an underlying racial tension in the community. This 
seems rooted in access to wealth rather than in naive racial prejudices. Most of the 
remaining businesses are owned by the white population in Doringbaai; the wealth 
portfolio and consequently the racial divide of the town has not changed dramatically 
since the demise of apartheid. 
5.3.4 Perception of the health of the marine resource 
All of the respondents that were interviewed thought that the Hottentot stock was 
relatively stable and were not concerned about it. 
- 28-
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
p
 To
wn
6.2 Sluck ('oo.~ltllil1 ls : 7 . .lUII: n {Ollringhllai III F.l.md .• h:a:ai {Area J,,~ 
B,conass abcn.e 75rnm 
,= 
"""" 
"""'" • < 
"0000 0 
~ 
.~ "''"'' , 
"-0 
'0000 
"""" 0 
0 0 • 
, ~ 0 • 
M N 
-
- - • 
0 
• 
, 
• • 0 0 • 0 - - -¥ur 
"""'1: . ... t: (h " .. U hill"." IIr WCRI. (I~ t () _ 2~) 7" n. n 
1l:"M "" "r<~: ~ I. I"In " R,,,,, "roo "-"""n ... n! ~"d Man.~. n ... n! C nlllp (M \I<.',~I) 
The !:>i,-'ma:;s <If the WCRL is the f''-'rti'-'Il of the rCS<-'Ufce th.1l CJn ~ 1C"J;.Il I} hanesl<.""d. 
Tho.' dam range I~ Jmm ]910 10 2j~1' 06 ""'a.oll From [.,., gr"ph II is ",idtlllllJut the 
WCRL slock has b.:cn decreasing graJually until 1')73 wilen it JUS! plummck'd and 
did 1\1.'1 ,<,co,er. This cl'uld be ~"pl~hled by O'W harvesting and o'~r capilalis.11ion in 
Ih,· W('RI. mdU~11) Ih,,[ look pIx" during Ihl .:r.l. 
' 0 
- .'- . 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
1 
'"'' 
100% 
Year 
r'l:g.t!: I'd' liDe ..... d \\ Otl. Zoo"" R (I'I!O _ !0(5) 
O:o.~ ~u .. ·.. : )brfr ... 1t~"'Mr<. -\ .... '"IUI ~ . .. \hn~:: ... n' ( ;roup \\' \It,\ \1) 
nl~ pristine lev,,!. i c. h<Jw the W('RI compareci to ~ach s"Cti<l!1 i1l1imc to its original 
k\d has also dc~1'I:a'<:l.l boraduall) urlil (II., 1<;173. It reached the ] 0'1. priSiine le\<:I in 
19(,< .mtl It:.:; ;.in~ ... - Ih,m tkt-reasru 10 J.~ of iTs prislim: Icw llrl rl>", 200:'06 ..... eRL 
Sea<.Oll. "I1lis m~~n~ that for every 100 of the ongina] weRL. "Ill) three ""j,( in I.,me 
u. 
- 33 . 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
"'" 3500 
£> ~ iJ ~" ~ * _","L. ~<$I ~'O ;y * ~ d" 
,,"!I ,,~ ~ .. 'II ,,~ ,,~ ,<IS" ~ ... ~: ~ ... '" , 0; <& 
T,me 
fij:IJn; J: Om"!,,'''',,) Calrb.TAC .-\Ik>o:.tiun < I ~zo _ !OO~) 7.(10 . R 
___ TAC 
1).1. "',uerr' ~lari"< He,,,,,,,,. Al.S(>!~\"'" u~ 1\. on.~ .... nl C roll r (MARA") 
The graph above ShOW5 th..' C()lnmerdal Ca\eh of WCRi ror lhl: p~'Twd 1':12 11 to 
::!OO506. It i ~ ~Yidem Jrom l)x, ),lrap lJ 1,/1:1\ "ho",\t:\t;T lht; WCRL ~l,,,,k hlO);. a "<.lip", it 
in~fC'3'>Cd .md n:co"~n:tl wi\})m .. II::" )eo.('. Ihis phenomenon look pl~ce up until 
1976. In a hid I" cnnirol tl:c harH'slinp. of \\'CRL. a L\C MIS inlMuced in 1979. 
Fn,rn ,n.;, graph one (all sec 1m! CQ;rune~la[ calch.:s '''.~ l~ "',... .. 1I~ IMII JlI\"\"IIl.' 
)cnrs. After han~ing llt 500\1T ho:l"~" tllO: "",riod 1990 and 1'1'9-1. t1-.: \\CKL 
de'rt'lid ~ll.JfJll~ I" 1 Sl M 1 IfI 19117. III ~ bid to recmer tho: 5\0(1;.. MtM ha:s 0111) 
all'lI:a(~d lf18 ~l r to HI<: \\.CRL i l)d\l~try in Zone 13 
--'-I . 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
% TACBIOMASS 
3500<,:, 
:r.J 00"1'> t 
• 
• 
2500% 
0 
• 2000% • 1 __ % TACJBIOMASS 
• 
• 
1500'f, 
~ 1000% 
500' 
"'" a m m , • • " 
" ~ N N " • • • 8 m m m m •  • - - N Yur 
.·I~u .... ~ : % L"C!l.IiOln~>i we. RL (I Q:U • :(I(I~ ) 7.{)n~ B 
Ihl" $<:1\11'«: \I.rille He>oor", ....... hOlt,,1 ~"d \boa~'nlenl (; r~1J r (\1,.. R .... M) 
Th~ Graph "bov~ show5 the p..:l'ce-I\lage- <11 ~<1mmcrcial ~atch mmp;.!r~'! 1\1 th~ bitl1na-s 
of the \\ CR I. In Zone D. 0 HC c~n ~e- thJ t bet>l C.::n Ih.:: period of 1 'l1'!2 :Ill.! ! ~I'!. the 
10'0 ].'\(' 'HIO/l !''\SS Jl"cll.t:,d.::u ho: lw~~11 10"0 and 1 70, ... und peakin!; in I ~75 at J2% oj 
[he- 1'>ioml'ls'>. In 3 bid 10 rcr.m::r Ih~ \\ (RI 'lvck in Zune B. /lICI\I has only alio;:.,lcu 
l>elv.-ecn 2.7'h 3/ld 2.8~% ochH'cn Ih~ ~r .. )d .)J :WOO ::md 2005'06. 
7. Whal fadurs can ,'untribute 1O:l surcessflll Co-managrmcnt 
programme bf'ing imJlJcIll ~nl cd in Duringbaai? 
rv·tnUllagem~nt CJl1 be praclicall) imrlcmcnt.:d 11l Th.>ringhu;,; b) I'ISSlglllng 
T~TTH''lTml U..., Rights in F ish~rics (IUKl~) 10 the cOmmullll) tn.:l)lho:r~. Tt'RF5 
a:<;.'<illtl rillhls 10 ir ;\i, j,h!:u" ",),L.lj" ~rv\lrs 10 fish in c.:nain local ioll~. ~~n.:ralJ) roseu 
\ .... long-51llilding IrnJ n ioo. rhl~ f,~ sIC ..... h •• 1J, l"~ p'-'kmiaJ. 10 pr()\ id~ rdl'llil t'ly Slahk 
,<><:iaIl Y'SlIpporlN iishCf) l11,:u~~l11Cn l:l. ... . h~ '~,h:m IN:~ local 1.n1'\\JOOf;t' 10 SOI\~ 
","11: <If Ih~ sy't<:ms prohkms'" (Ch::uk,. ZOO I ). 
, h .. lOll"" in I"""ali,", ~n TL RF ','LollIS. rl.a~ .on.ulll;h..1rb. A COO I t (.'h~p,,",· 6 I ',. ,.);,,,11 
~"J ,.,,,,m;ihie}ishe,i •. ,.II1f<ifi"l( an'''.' ~n" h~""'JI"'1i: '/v""gh ,;y/ot,·!x...d "WI1I'!i<"'<MI 
""" f.,>.o)'1 J(>C"fgl: W5 ,,~ "£ ' 142~<98.hl!n!bm!!$ -I J ",:c~d (m 11" ::;).'05'200' 
·35 . 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
The community would harvest the resource as a monopoly and therefore harvest at 
the maximum sustainable yield. If the community acts cohesively and rationally, the 
resource will be managed in an optimal manner and over exploitation and over 
capitalisation in the industry will not take place. The community will not act as a 
rational unit if their discount rates are high i.e. if the community members value the 
present use of the resource more than they value the future use of the resource. Poor 
fishing communities are typically characterised by high discount rates since they need 
to provide for their family now. 
The resource is rich and communities do not necessarily need to be poor if the 
resource is managed properly. The pristine level of WCRL in Zone B is currently 3% 
and therefore it is depleted. If Government were to buy back all of the quotas of 
WCRL and prohibit any harvesting of WCRL along the West Coast of South Africa 
for five years, i.e. from 2007 to 20 II, it has been shown that the biomass of WCRL 
would increase by 167%Y For this to be successfully implemented, i.e. so that 
poaching does not occur, it is important that alternative employment is created for the 
artisinal fishermen that rely on WCRL as a means to income. The Government could 
employ these fishermen in a short-term public works programme. Importantly the 
demand for public works progranune is increasing ahead of the demand generated in 
the region with respect to the 2010 Soccer World Cup. 
Once the five years have been completed, Government could then give fishing 
communities that fulfil certain criteria, TURFs. TURFs and not individual rights 
should be assigned because individual rights are leased and are not privately owned. 
There is no guarantee that the user of the individual right will be allocated a right in 
the future and therefore there is no incentive to invest in the resource. TURFs on the 
other hand could potentially ensure sustained cooperation among community 
members because there are repeated interactions. Since community members reside in 
the area, the interaction is viewed as long-term and over-exploitation in the short-term 
is unlikely to occur. Cheating and free riding are less likely to occur, especially in a 
small community like Doringbaai, because the social network is small and everyone 
I7 Susan Holloway (nee Johnston) 
Marine Resource Assessment and Management Group (MARAM) 
Department of Maths and Applied Maths 
University of Cape Town 
Rondebosch 
Cape Town, 7700 
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can observe each other's interaction and behaviour patterns. If a person is caught 
cheating, the rest of the community could punish him by excluding him from further 
interactions. 
It has been suggested that the recreational take of the community be given to the 
community as a community quota. This implies that there will not be a need to 
increase the TAC of WCRL. There are This will not work for two reasons. The first 
being that tourism is an alternative source for income to small communities such as 
Doringbaai, as it provides employment to community members that do not work in 
the fishing industry. Recreational fishers is one of the activities that are offered by the 
community. Redistributing the recreational allocation to the community would 
therefore have negative consequences on the tourist industry that small towns often 
depend on. 
Secondly, Marine and Coastal Management would be wary of implementing this 
system. I suggested this system to one of the officials at Marine and Coastal 
Management, and he explained that giving the community the recreational allocation 
would be regressing to the system before the limited commercial sector was 
introduced. 
The state and the community would manage the resource together. Scientists would 
provide the community with information regarding the stock levels. Additionally, the 
scientists would advise the community to as to the level of harvest. The community 
would then choose what the next best step would be and a portion of the profit made 
would go into a public pot. The money collected would be used to reinvest into the 
WCRL resource. 
This type of progranune could only work in Doringbaai if the social network is 
strengthened. The immediate need in Doringbaai is for employment opportunities. 
For the long-term however, the community needs to invest in its social development, 
i.e. to build its skill base. There are currently no employment opportunities to absorb 
those that have completed their education. This has a negative effect on the youth 
because it means that they have nothing to aspire to, and so do not see the objective of 
completing their education. Since many of the parents are unemployed, they do not 
have the money to send their children to high school. In the past, Oceana employed 
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these learners. Additionally, primary school learners are also leaving school. The 
situation in Doringbaai is therefore very sad because there is going to be a generation 
of young adults that do not have education. 
The success of the programme therefore rests on the social cohesion of the 
community. From my short stay in Doringbaai, I could see that although the older 
community members had a strong sense of self and community pride, it was lacking 
in the younger generation because they had no role models and they did not see a 
bright future for themselves. The community leaders are trying to start projects to 
inspire the youth, but with limited funding and poverty surrounding them, it is no 
easy task. 
The television plays a great role in the lives of the youth as it leaves a residue of 
discontent since they want to aspire to more than what they have, but they lack the 
tools to do so. 
The literature shows that there arc numerous benefits as well as drawbacks to the co-
management regime. Importantly, it cannot be used as a panacea to cure all ills of the 
modern day fisheries management system. Rather, it needs to be researched, well 
thought out and stakeholders need to be involved in the implementation of this system 
so that a system that is applicable to the area can be born. The reason why co-
management works is because it is created for specific instances and therefore no 
standard model of co-management exists or can be applied homogenously. 
There is no easy answer, but I firmly believe that if the community of Doringbaai was 
given the opportunity, they would be able to make a success of the co-management 
programme. This however needs to occur in conjunction with an employment-
creating strategy, because without this, fishermen will continue to rely on the ocean to 
support their families. When policy makers are drawing up the policies, they need to 
understand that they are not dealing with rational, self-interested human beings as 
taught in the textbooks. Rather, these fishermen are poor; they lack marketable skills, 
access to credit and critical information so a policy that may work on paper and 
which may work as an academic exercise may very well not work in the fishermen's 
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world where he faces many constraints that cannot be captured by models, formulas, 
and statistics. 
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Appendix A 
Statistics South Africa 
Education - South Africa by Province and Municipality 
Table 1 
Employment status by Population group 
for Person weighted, Doringbaai 
Black African I Coloured I 
Employed 
Unemployed 
Scholar or student 
Home-maker or housewife 
Pensioner or retired person/to old to work 
Unable to work due to illness or disability 
Seasonal worker not working presently 
Does not choose to work 
Could not find work 
Not applicable (younger than 15 and older than 65) 
Total 
Table 1 Employment Status by Population Group, Doringbaai 
Source: Census 1996 
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15 168 
15 212 
3 49 
3 62 
3 27 
42 
63 
3 15 
9 
21 384 
63 1030 
White 
18 
6 
9 
15 
48 
Total 
201 
233 
52 
74 
30 
42 
63 
18 
9 
420 
1141 
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Appendix B 
Statistics South Africa 
Education - South Africa by Province and Municipality 
Table 1 
Highest educational level by Population group 
for Person weighted, Doringbaai 
Black African Coloured White Total 
No schooling 9 94 a 103 
Grade 1/sub A (completed or 
in process) a 45 a 45 
Grade 2/sub B a 24 3 27 
Grade 3/standard 1 3 35 a 38 
Grade 4/standard 2 6 49 a 55 
Grade 5/standard 3 3 43 3 49 
Grade 6/standard 4 3 68 a 71 
Grade 7/standard 5 3 112 3 118 
Grade 8/standard 6/form 1 12 240 a 252 
Grade 9/standard 7/form 2 6 76 a 82 
Grade 1 a/standard 8/form 
3/NTC I 15 56 9 80 
Grade 11/standard 9/form 
4/NTC II a 30 3 33 
Grade 12/standard 1 a/form 
5/matric.lNTC III 3 27 18 48 
Certificate with less than 
grade 12 a a a 0 
Diploma with less than grade 
12 a a a 0 
Certificate with grade 12 a 9 a 9 
Diploma with grade 12 a 15 6 21 
Bachelor's degree a a a 0 
Total 63 925 45 1033 
Table 2 Education Levels, Doringbaai 
Source: Census 1996 
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Appendix C 
Employed 
Unemployed 
Scholar or student 
Home-maker or 
Pensioner or retired 
person/to old to work 
Unable to work due to 
illness or disability 
Seasonal worker not 
working presently 
Does not choose to work 
Could not find work 
Total 
Statistics South Africa 
Welfare - South Africa by Province and Municipality 
Table 1 
Employment status by Individual monthly income 
for Person weighted, Doringbaai 
R801 - R1 601 -
No income R1 - R400 R1600 R3200 
6 6 57 66 36 
224 3 6 
49 
75 3 
3 18 3 
18 24 
33 9 12 9 
9 
15 
432 15 114 84 39 
Table 3 Employment Status by Individual monthly income 
Source: Ceosus 2001 
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R3 201 - R6 401 - R12801 
R6400 R12800 or more Total 
27 6 204 
3 236 
49 
78 
24 
42 
63 
3 12 
15 
33 6 0 723 
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Appendix D 
Statistics South Africa 
Welfare - South Africa by Province and Municipality 
Table 1 
Employed 
Unemployed 
Scholar or student 
Home-maker or 
Pensioner or retired 
person/to old to work 
Unable to work due to 
illness or disability 
Seasonal worker not 
working presently 
Does not choose to 
Could not find work 
Not applicable (younger 
than 15 and older than 
Total 
Employment status by Population group 
for Person weighted, Doringbaai 
Black African I Coloured I Indian or Asian 
9 174 
3 215 
3 46 
6 72 
3 18 
42 
3 57 
3 9 
15 
24 379 
54 1028 
Table 4 Employment Status by Population Group 
Source: Census 2001 
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White I Total 
21 204 
18 236 
49 
78 
3 24 
42 
3 63 
12 
15 
15 418 
60 1142 
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Appendix E: Survey Form 
1. Background Information: 
Name: 
Date of Birth 
Level of Schooling (last grade/std. completed): 
Gender: 
How long have you lived in this community? 
Employment status: Employed or unemployed 
Sector Employed 
How many people are there in your household? 
a) Dependents 
b) income earners .................. .. 
How much does your household spend monthly? 
What proportion of your household income is spent on: 
Proportion of Income 
Water/ Electricity/municipal charges 
Schooling 
Food 
Rent 
Transport 
Savings 
Other Please specify: 
If you applied for a quota/s: Why do you think that you did/did not get it? 
Does any of your immediate family own a quota? How are you related? 
Do you own a recreational permit? 
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For which resource? 
Do you sell the catch caught with a permit? 
How much of your working time is spent on other forms of employment? 
indicate the proportion of this time in full time/seasonal/sporadic work 
I Full time I Seasonal I Sporadic 
Do you receive any state grants? 
Specify (e.g. State pension, Private pension, UIF) 
Do you rely mainly on fishing for your livelihood? 
What other sources of income or ways of providing food do you have? 
None Local Migrancy Agriculture Tourism Local Other 
Employment Trade (describe) 
How healthy do think the rock lobster and fish resources are in the waters 
off Doringbaai? (give as a % of what you have heard there was here thirty 
years ago - number and size are both important) 
a) rock lobster 
b) fish 
2. Market/Current System (interlinked) 
Supply Side: 
How long have you been fishing? 
How many years has your family been involved in fishing? 
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Where do you fish? 
How far do you live from where you fish? 
How many kilometres of coastline do you use? 
What is the furthest that you go out? 
Where do you go out? 
How often do you fish per week? 
Do you fish alone or in a crew? 
How do you split the catch among a crew? 
Does everyone in the community use the same system? 
Approximately how much do you catch (per person) per day? 
a) rock lobster in Season: 
out of Season: 
b) other fish in season: 
out of season: 
Approximately how many days per year do you go out? 
What do you fish for? 
How do you fish? trek net, boat seine net, hoop trap, hand-line, other? 
what proportion of fishers in Doringbaai use boats? 
what proportion of boats are motorised? 
What percentage of your catch do you sell? 
How much of the fish do you use for your own consumption? 
When do you fish? 
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Through out Spring Summer Autumn Winter 
the year 
What happens when there is bad weather? How does this affect your 
fishing? 
Investment in the industry: 
Do you own: 
Asset Value (Rands) 
Bakkie 
Boat (motorised?) 
Refrigeration 
Other specify 
What capital resources do you work with? Have you ever needed to take out 
a business loan? 
Are there any local cold storage facilities? Do local people have access to 
these? What is the charge? 
Frigeration/ Number Size How Far? Local Charge? 
Freezer access? 
y N Y N Y N 
Demand Side 
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Where do the fishers sell their fish? 
Within the community nearby (less than 20 km or far away (greater 
from the point of than20km) 
harvest 
Who are the Proportion of Distance travelled 
buyers? buyers to buy resource 
Housewives 
Holiday makers 
Restaurant 
Owners 
Factory Owners 
Middleman 
Other (specify) 
Price 
What products do you sell? 
What factors influence the price? (Weather, demand, season) 
When do you receive the highest price? 
And the lowest price? 
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3. Perceptions of Compliance and the Community 
Community: 
Is there conflict in the community? 
Have there been any problems with recreational, commercial fishers or 
fishers from other areas? What kind of problems did you encounter? 
Recreational: YIN 
Type of problem: 
Commercial Fishers: YIN 
Type of problem: 
Fishers from other areas: YIN 
Type of problem: 
Are there different groups within the community? YIN 
Who are they? 
Who works together? 
Is there conflict between the people that received the quota and those that 
didn't receive a quota? 
Who are the leaders within the community? 
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Who holds the power within the community? (those with money, those 
that received the quota) 
Are there large income differentials within the community? YIN 
Compliance: 
Do fishers a) know the regulations 
b) keep the regulations? 
Do you think that the rules are fair? 
Elab: 
What happens to the people who break the rules for harvesting the fish 
and other resources? 
Is this a major deterrent? 
Elab: 
Is there an established relationship between MCM and the fishers? 
Is there active law enforcement in the area? 
Is it effective? 
If no, why is it not effective? (Too few people, corruption, conflict with the 
community, other) 
Who enforces the rules? 
What do you think are the key problems with the management of the fishing 
industry? 
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